Seeing Iraq and Afghanistan In Another Light

It was hardly surprising that the conference room in the International Relations building on Bay State Road was packed in the early afternoon of April 9. General David D. McKiernan, a former U.S. Army General who served through 2009 as the main commander for all ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, came to speak about his perspective on the wars and what he believed one could glean from them. Using PowerPoint slides mainly as reference for those of us who were not as familiar with the territory in both these countries, the general talked with the participants, rather than at them.

He began by placing emphasis on the idea that it’s easy to get involved in a war or conflict, but it is twice as difficult to get out. Using key reference points, General McKiernan led the audience through both campaigns to enter Afghanistan and Iraq.

Plot twist: he ruthlessly slaughtered the planning.

For Iraq, the matter on which he focused the most was the failure of the U. power structure to see both the unstable environment that resulted from the fall Baathist regime and the influx of foreign extremists, plus the criminal activity that ensued. This disaster resulting from Saddam’s flight, he argued, was caused by the lack of human intelligence, a 30-year-long Baathist fear, and historical fault lines within the Iraqi people themselves.

Promotional poster for guest lecture by Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker | Photo courtesy of BU Center for International Relations
Promotional poster for guest lecture by General David D. McKiernan.  |  Photo courtesy of the BU Center for International Relations.

In discussing Afghanistan, the General emphasized the fact that Afghanistan was a war of revenge. The people of the United States clamored for a response, as we can see from the past, and President Bush provided them with one. But what he did make note of was the importance of being “all in” for a war effort, something which we have not done with Afghanistan or Iraq.

McKiernan also analyzed the predominance of the Department of Defense in both invasions, and additionally noted the manner in which it failed to place enough focus on the “day after Saddam falls” within Iraq.  It seems hard to believe, as he told the participants, that strategists compared Iraq’s occupation situation to Germany and Japan after World War II.  The massive repercussions US officials faced for doing so were made evident. One short and sweet way to phrase this sentiment was to emphasize always knowing your environment when invading another country.

One of the points that remained poignant long after the discussion was the generals’ description of the purchases of thousands of gas-masks and other preventative measures toward the chemical and biological weapons that were supposed to be present in Iraq. Fear of the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was rampant. Furthermore, the money we exerted in an effort to protect ourselves was for nothing. He continued by sharing a personal account of a moment in the invasion, recalling his team’s utilization of these gas masks. As one can imagine, temperatures most likely shot up by 10, if not 15 degrees for these soldiers, up from the already triple digit daily temperatures in the region.

The takeaway point the general repeated again and again was: war is, in of itself, a failure of humanity. There is no war fought solely for righteous reasons, and there will always be consequences that strategists cannot predict. Through intensive development and preparation, countries like the USA can avoid these pitfalls. However, for Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems all too clear we did neither.

About Gabriella Gricius

Gabriella Gricius (CAS ’15) is from northern Virginia, near to Washington, D.C. She studies International Relations and Linguistics. When she is not in class, she works with the student theater group Wandering Minds as a techie, spends time with the Linguistics Association and Model United Nations, and loves any kind of books long with chess.

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